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Remi Moncel and Harro van Asselt
While taking notable incremental steps forward,
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have so far, in aggre-
gate, been unable to scale up their ambition tomitigate
climate change so as to hold a rise in global average
temperature below 2° Celsius above pre-industrial
levels. In this introduction to the special issue, it is
posited that the UNFCCC has played and should con-
tinue to play an essential role in instigating and coor-
dinating a global response to climate change.
However, in the face of continuing difficulty in stabi-
lizing the global climate at safe levels, it is argued here
that the UNFCCC is by no means alone in addressing
this challenge and that wider international coopera-
tion is possible in a way that complements the inter-
national climate negotiations. This article shows how
a variety of international institutions outside of the
UNFCCC have sought – albeit with modest results to
date – to address climate change, and indicates how
these institutions could be enhanced to deliver greater
climate change mitigation benefits. It then illustrates
how these institutions may interact with the UNFCCC
process, and examines the role of the UNFCCC in
ensuring that the various institutions work in a
complementary fashion.
INTRODUCTION
The adoption of the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 embod-
ied the international community’s determination to
address the global climate change problem.1 Since then,
the international climate negotiations have achieved
notable advances. In particular, they have created a
body of international institutions and norms that con-
stitute the only universal mechanism for addressing
climate change in a comprehensive manner. The
UNFCCC has played a crucial role by catalyzing climate
action at various levels of governance, building an insti-
tutional infrastructure, facilitating learning and
enhancing trust among parties, and generally keeping
climate change on the international policy agenda.2
Furthermore, since the creation of the Durban Platform
for Enhanced Action in 2011,3 the prospects for height-
ened cooperation seem somewhat brighter. However,
more than 20 years after the adoption of the Conven-
tion, it has become clear that to avoid climate impacts
that would be perceived as dangerous by many coun-
tries and individuals, a drastic cut in greenhouse gas
emissions beyond the current level of effort is not only
necessary, but also needs to happen urgently.4 Despite
incremental progress, a lack of political will means
that the global emission reductions achieved so far
are inadequate to meet the UNFCCC’s objectives of
‘prevent[ing] dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system’5 and ‘reducing global green-
house gas emissions so as to hold the increase in global
average temperature below 2°C above pre- industrial
levels’.6
Although the situation may thus seem dire, this special
issue of RECIEL draws attention to the fact that the
UNFCCC could be complemented by other interna-
tional institutions in its efforts to tackle climate change.
Over the years, a wide variety of institutions has started,
directly or indirectly, and with varying levels of success,
to address certain aspects of the climate problem
outside of the UNFCCC. In this special issue, we
1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (New
York, 9 May 1992; in force 21 March 1994) (‘UNFCCC’).
2 J. Depledge and F. Yamin, ‘The Global Climate-Change Regime: A
Defence’, in: D. Helm and C. Hepburn (eds.), The Economics and
Politics of Climate Change (Oxford University Press, 2009), 433, at
439–443; A. Vihma and H. van Asselt, Great Expectations: Under-
standing Why the UN Climate Negotiations Seem to Fail, FIIA Briefing
Paper 109 (Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2012), at 6–7.
3 Decision 1/CP.17, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on
the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/
9/Add.1, 15 March 2012).
4 K. Anderson and A. Bows, ‘Beyond “Dangerous” Climate Change:
Emission Scenarios for a New World’, 369 Philosophical Transac-
tions of the Royal Society A (2011), 20, at 41; J. Rogelj et al., ‘Emis-
sion Pathways Consistent with a 2°C Global Temperature Limit’, 1:8
Nature Climate Change (2011), 413, at 413.
5 UNFCCC, n. 1 above, Article 2.
6 Decision 1/CP.16, The Cancún Agreements: Outcome of the Work
of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under
the Convention (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 March 2011),
at paragraph 4. For analyses of the emission reduction pledges made
in the climate negotiations against the benchmark of limiting global
average temperature increases to 2°C see, e.g., J. Rogelj et al.,
‘Copenhagen Pledges are Paltry’ 464:7292 Nature (2010), 1126;
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), The Emissions
Gap Report: Are the Copenhagen Accord Pledges Sufficient to Limit
Global Warming to 2°C or 1.5°C? A Preliminary Assessment (UNEP,
2010); UNEP, Bridging the Emissions Gap (UNEP, 2011).
bs_bs_banner
Review of European Community & International Environmental Law
RECIEL 21 (3) 2012. ISSN 0962-8797
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
163
examine how to bolster this broader regime complex for
climate change.7 Our focus on international institutions
outside of the UNFCCC is not meant to suggest that
climate negotiations have failed or should be forsaken.
Rather, we argue that there is no single solution in the
international legal response to climate change, and that
an all-hands-on-deck approach is likely to be neces-
sary.8 While the UNFCCC thus has an important role to
play in any effective international framework, we
believe it is also necessary to examine in greater detail
to which extent and how institutions beyond the
UNFCCC could complement the activities of the climate
regime and further scale up mitigation ambition.
The focus of this special issue is, first, on multilateral
institutions, which include the regimes established by
several multilateral environmental agreements, the
United Nations (UN) human rights system and the
world trading system; and, second, on ‘minilateral’
institutions,9 which include various initiatives under-
taken by a limited number of countries to tackle specific
aspects of climate change.10 We acknowledge that some
of these institutions are not operating completely inde-
pendently from the UNFCCC. Several provisions in the
Convention explicitly authorize more or less formal
cooperation among the UNFCCC, its parties and other
international institutions.11 Moreover, several decisions
adopted by climate negotiators have sought to reach out
to other international institutions.12 However, the inter-
national institutions examined in this special issue each
have their own decision-making processes independent
of the UNFCCC. So while these institutions may be
influenced by the climate regime, they are also beyond
the control of UNFCCC decision makers. Furthermore,
where cooperation already exists between the UNFCCC
and other international institutions, we examine ways
in which it could be strengthened.
Against this background, the aims of this special issue
are twofold. First, it seeks to show how international
institutions outside of the UNFCCC have sought to
address climate change, and how they could be
enhanced to deliver greater climate change benefits as a
complement to the UNFCCC.13 Second, it aims to reflect
on the role of these initiatives vis-à-vis the UNFCCC in
order to ensure that the various institutions work
together in a complementary fashion with a view to
increasing ambition within the broader regime complex
for climate change. In addition to meeting ambitious
objectives, a fully functioning regime complex will
need to be fair and equitable, including by respecting
the UNFCCC’s principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC).14
The special issue builds on an emerging body of litera-
ture on the relationship between theUNFCCC and other
institutions. Various studies have pointed out how other
institutions have started to tackle climate-change-
related issues,15 and have provided insights into how
other forums interact with theUNclimate regime.16 This
7 The term ‘regime complex’ was coined by Raustiala and Victor, who
define it as ‘an array of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical
institutions governing a particular issue area’. K. Raustiala and D.
Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’, 58:2
International Organization (2004), 277, at 279. See also R.O.
Keohane and D.G. Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Climate
Change’, 9:1 Perspective on Politics (2011), 7.
8 See also C. Bausch and M. Mehling, Addressing the Challenge of
Global Climate Mitigation: An Assessment of Existing Venues and
Institutions (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2011), at 48; D. Bodansky, Mul-
tilateral Climate Efforts beyond the UNFCCC (Center for Climate and
Energy Solutions, 2011), at 16.
9 On ‘minilateralism’ generally, see M. Naím, ‘Minilateralism: The
Magic Number to Get Real International Action’, Foreign Policy (July/
August 2009), 5. On minilateralism in international climate policy, see
J.S. McGee, ‘Exclusive Minilateralism: An Emerging Discourse within
International Climate Change Governance?’, 8:3 Portal – Journal of
Multidisciplinary International Studies (2011), 1; R. Eckersley,
‘Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or Mini-
lateralism?’, 12:2 Global Environmental Politics (2012), 24.
10 This special issue does not specifically examine private initiatives
outside of the UNFCCC. For good recent discussions, see, e.g., P.
Pattberg and J. Stripple, ‘Beyond the Public and Private Divide:
Remapping Transnational Climate Governance in the 21st Century’,
8:4 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Eco-
nomics (2008), 367; M.J. Hoffmann, Climate Governance at the
Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after Kyoto
(Oxford University Press, 2011); K.W. Abbott, ‘The Transnational
Regime Complex for Climate Change’, 30:4 Environment and Plan-
ning C: Government and Policy (2012), 571.
11 See, e.g., UNFCCC, n. 1 above, Article 3.3 (‘[e]fforts to address
climate change may be carried out cooperatively by interested
Parties’); and various clauses under Article 4.1. Furthermore, the
Convention specifies that climate finance can be provided ‘through
bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels’. Ibid., Article 11.5.
12 See, e.g., Decision 13/CP.8, Cooperation with Other Conventions
(UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1, 28 March 2003).
13 Although they also have an important role to play, bilateral institu-
tions are outside the scope of this special issue.
14 UNFCCC, n. 1 above, Article 3.1.
15 See, e.g., H. van Asselt, J. Gupta and F. Biermann, ‘Advancing the
Climate Agenda: Exploiting Material and Institutional Linkages to
Develop a Menu of Policy Options’, 14:3 Review of European Com-
munity and International Environmental Law, 255; K. Michonski and
M.A. Levi, Harnessing International Institutions to Address Climate
Change (Council on Foreign Relations, 2010); C. Bausch and M.
Mehling, n. 8 above; D. Bodansky, n. 8 above; R. Rayfuse and S.V.
Scott (eds.), International Law in the Era of Climate Change (Edward
Elgar, 2012).
16 See, e.g., S. Oberthür, ‘The Climate Change Regime: Interactions
with ICAO, IMO and the EU Burden-sharing Agreement’, in: S. Ober-
thür and T. Gehring (eds.), Institutional Interaction in Global Environ-
mental Governance. Synergy and Conflict among International and
EU Policies (MIT Press, 2006), 53; H. van Asselt, F. Sindico and M.A.
Mehling, ‘Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation of Interna-
tional Law’, 30:4 Law and Policy (2008), 423; F. Biermann, P. Patt-
berg, H. van Asselt, and F. Zelli, ‘The Fragmentation of Global
Governance Architectures: A Framework for Analysis’, 9:4 Global
Environmental Politics (2009), 14; F. Biermann, ‘Beyond the Intergov-
ernmental Regime: Recent Trends in Global Carbon Governance’,
2:4 Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 284; M.J. Hoff-
mann, n. 10 above; R.O. Keohane and D.G. Victor, n. 7 above; M.A
Young, ‘Climate Change Law and Regime Interaction’, 4:2 Carbon
and Climate Law Review (2011), 147; F. Zelli, ‘The Fragmentation of
the Global Climate Governance Architecture’, 2:2 WIREs Climate
Change (2011), 255; K.W. Abbott, n. 10 above.
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special issue seeks to add value by not only examining
the contribution of other institutions to climate policy
goals, but also discussing the conditions under which
these institutions could come to an appropriate division
of labour with the UNFCCC that makes use of their
respective strengths, and by examining how new initia-
tives outside the UNFCCC could increase the overall
mitigation ambition of the international community.
The remainder of this introductory article is structured
as follows. First, we briefly discuss the current state and
future of international climate law and policy, showing
that although modest progress has been made at recent
Conferences of the Parties (COPs), some of the crunch
issues remain to be addressed. We then move on to
provide an overview of the (potential) contributions by
a variety of institutions outside the UNFCCC, drawing
on the articles in this special issue. Next, we examine
how these institutions interact with the UNFCCC, and
reflect on the role for the UNFCCC in the emerging
regime complex. In our concluding remarks, we sum-
marize our main findings and provide suggestions for
the way forward, including recommendations for
further inquiry.
THE (UNCERTAIN) FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE LAW
AND POLICY
Despite the significant uncertainty that surrounds
international climate law and policy today, the contours
of tomorrow’s international climate policy architecture
can be sketched based on recent developments. One of
the biggest uncertainties in the climate regime has been
what type of framework will govern the cooperation of
countries after the end of the first commitment period
of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012.17 The inability of
UNFCCC parties to come to an agreement in Copen-
hagen in 2009 cast doubt over the viability of a com-
prehensive legally binding agreement to regulate global
greenhouse gas emissions. A year later, at COP-16 in
Cancún, parties seemed to vindicate the approach
adopted by political leaders in the Danish capital by
formally acknowledging countries’ voluntarymitigation
and finance pledges, and by establishing mechanisms
under the UNFCCC to review and fund these pledges.18
At the same time, parties also agreed to continue nego-
tiations on the Kyoto Protocol.
In December 2011, parties in Durban charted a path
that offered some level of clarity on both the future of
the Kyoto Protocol and on cooperation of countries
under the Convention. On the Kyoto Protocol side,
parties agreed to a second commitment period,
although without specifying precise mitigation targets
or the length of the period.19 Under the Convention,
Parties launched a process to ‘raise the level of ambi-
tion’ under the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action.20
Parties decided to launch a work plan to identify and
explore ‘a range of actions that can close the ambition
gap with a view to ensuring the highest possible miti-
gation efforts by all Parties’, which could include addi-
tional steps beyond countries’ current pledges before
2020.21 From 2020 onwards, a new international agree-
ment, to be adopted by 2015, should enter into force
and be ‘applicable to all Parties’,22 either as substitute or
a complement to the Kyoto Protocol. Here again, many
details remain to be filled in – in particular, the con-
tents of the commitments for all parties involved and
the type of legal instrument that will be used.23
Some of the outstanding issues surrounding the future
of the climate regime may be clarified at COP-18 in
Doha in 2012. Still, UNFCCC parties have yet to dem-
onstrate their ability, in aggregate, to adopt and imple-
ment greenhouse gas reduction commitments
commensurate with the scale and urgency of the
climate problem. There are various possible reasons for
this. Some scholars have argued that this lack of ambi-
tion derives from inherent institutional inefficiencies –
in particular, the requirement that all decisions be
adopted by consensus by 195 countries.24 Others have
argued that the problem of climate change is one that is
simply too vast and complex to be resolved through a
single instrument or multilateral forum, but rather
requires a ‘bottom-up’ approach.25 Yet other scholars
point to ‘dysfunctional North–South politics’ as one of
17 The Kyoto Protocol sets targets for its developed country parties for
the period 2008–2012. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto, 11 December 1997; in
force 16 February 2005) (‘Kyoto Protocol’), Article 3.1.
18 Decision 1/CP.16, n. 6 above. See also L. Rajamani, ‘The Cancun
Climate Change Agreements: Reading the Text, Subtext and Teale-
aves’, 60:2 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2011), 499.
19 Decision 1/CMP.7, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto
Protocol at Its Sixteenth Session (UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/
Add.1, 15 March 2012), at paragraph 1.
20 Decision 1/CP.17, n. 3 above, at paragraph 6.
21 Ibid., at paragraphs 7–8.
22 Decision 1/CP.17 calls for ‘a protocol, another legal instrument or
an agreed outcome with legal force under the [UNFCCC] applicable
to all Parties’. Ibid., at paragraph 2.
23 R. Moncel, ‘Unconstructive Ambiguity in the Durban Climate Deal
of COP 17/CMP 7’, 12:2 Sustainable Development Law and Policy
(2012), 6; L. Rajamani, ‘The Durban Platform on Enhanced Action
and the Future of the Climate Regime’, 61:2 International and Com-
parative Law Quarterly (2012), 501.
24 See, e.g., G. Prins and S. Rayner, ‘Time to Ditch Kyoto’, 449:25
Nature (2007), 973, at 974; D.G. Victor, Global Warming Gridlock:
Creating More Effective Strategies for Protecting the Planet (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2011), at 210–215.
25 See, e.g., G. Prins and S. Rayner, n. 24 above, at 974; M. Hulme,
Why We Disagree about Climate Change (Cambridge University
Press, 2009), at 311–315; S. Rayner, ‘How to Eat an Elephant: A
Bottom-up Approach to Climate Policy’, 10:6 Climate Policy (2010),
615. While authors tend to contrast ‘bottom-up’ with ‘top-down’
approaches, these approaches do not have to exclude each other.
See, e.g., N.K. Dubash and L. Rajamani, ‘Beyond Copenhagen: Next
Steps’, 10:6 Climate Policy (2010), 593, at 594–596; H. van Asselt
RECIEL 21 (3) 2012 CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION BEYOND THE UNFCCC
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
165
the climate regime’s weaknesses.26 They argue that the
distinction between those countries listed in the
annexes to the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol
(developed countries) and those not included in them
(developing countries) serves to perpetuate ideological
and political divides. But perhaps one of the most
important reasons is that the international climate
negotiations, like many other debates in world politics,
reflect rather than drive national politics, and mobiliz-
ing national constituencies is necessary to drive a global
transition to a low-carbon economy.27 In particular, the
ambition level of the UNFCCC and the goodwill of its
parties are constrained if the world’s largest emitters,
and in particular the United States, are unwilling to
enhance their ambition domestically. Conversely, true
leadership on the part of the world’s largest absolute
and historical emitters, including through the full
implementation of the commitments under the Kyoto
Protocol, would go a long way towards unlocking some
of the distrust that currently characterizes the UNFCCC
process.28
In any case, looking beyond the UNFCCC may be ben-
eficial. While we argue that the UNFCCC still has a
crucial part to play, the climate stands to benefit from
the increased mobilization of other international insti-
tutions as a complement to the UNFCCC. This could
be, first of all, because other institutions are smaller,
involve like-minded ‘climate-friendly’ countries in the
form of coalitions, or have a useful track record at
reaching decisions involving a large number of coun-
tries. Second, multiple specialized venues could each
address a small piece of a puzzle that the UNFCCC
could not tackle as a whole. Third, other institutions
may be better able to mobilize national governments
and constituencies that have remained silent or resis-
tant – for example, by framing climate impacts and
policies in terms of human rights or national security.
Ultimately, the ability of these other institutions to
make a decisive difference in the collective fight
against climate change depends on whether they are
able to help overcome the underlying barriers that
have weakened international cooperation within the
UNFCCC itself or whether they might instead be the
wrong tools to address these roadblocks.
CLIMATE ACTION OUTSIDE
THE UNFCCC
This section sketches how various institutions outside
of the UNFCCC have contributed or could contribute to
mobilizing climate action. We do not review the full
suite of international institutions that may have a role
to play in addressing climate change. Rather than pro-
viding a comprehensive survey, we identify a sub-set of
international institutions that we find to be particularly
illustrative of the potential to enhance international
cooperation on climate change.
ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTIONS
Climate change is physically linked to many other
environmental problems, and could therefore be
tackled through channels focused primarily on
addressing these other environmental challenges.
First, climate change is closely related to ozone deple-
tion in various ways. Because certain ozone-depleting
substances are also potent greenhouse gases,29 the
reduction of ozone depleting substances, as promoted
through the 1985 Vienna Convention30 and its 1987
Montreal Protocol,31 can also result in significant
climate benefits. Indeed, the Montreal Protocol is said
to have contributed more to climate protection than
the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.32
In their contribution, Zaelke, Andersen and Borgford-
Parnell underline the success of the Montreal Protocol
in terms of climate mitigation, demonstrating how it
has addressed a smaller and more manageable piece
of the larger climate problem by tackling ozone deplet-
ing substances. However, the effects of the Montreal
Protocol’s contribution were in part negated by the
fact that two of the substitutes it promoted – hydro-
chlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) and hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs) – also contribute to climate change. Parties to
the Montreal Protocol have addressed this issue by
adopting a decision in 2007 significantly accelerating
the phasing out of the consumption and production of
HCFCs,33 while a similar proposal for HFCs is still
and F. Zelli, ‘Connect the Dots: Managing the Fragmentation of
Global Climate Governance’, Environmental Economics and Policy
Studies (2012, forthcoming).
26 See J. Depledge and F. Yamin, n. 2 above, at 443.
27 See, e.g., D. Sprinz and M. Weiß, ‘Domestic Politics and Global
Climate Policy’, in: U. Luterbacher and D. Sprinz (eds.), International
Relations and Global Climate Change (MIT Press, 2001), 67, at
67–68.
28 A full analysis of the causes of, and remedies for, the relatively slow
pace of progress in the UNFCCC negotiations is beyond the scope of
this article. We introduce some of the main arguments here for
background purposes and to highlight the relevance and limits of the
various approaches presented by the articles in this special issue.
29 See, e.g., S. Oberthür, ‘Linkages between the Montreal and Kyoto
Protocols: Enhancing Synergies between Protecting the Ozone Layer
and the Global Climate’, 1:3 International Environmental Agreements:
Politics, Law and Economics, 357; UNEP Assessment Panel on the
Environmental Effects of Stratospheric Ozone Depletion, Environ-
mental Effects of Ozone Depletion and Its Interactions with Climate
Change: 2002 Assessment (UNEP, 2002).
30 Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna, 22
March 1985; in force 22 September 1988).
31 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal,
16 September 1987; in force 1 January 1989).
32 G. Velders et al., ‘The Importance of the Montreal Protocol in Pro-
tecting Climate’, 104:12 Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences (2007), 4814, at 4814.
33 Decision XIX/6, Adjustments to the Montreal Protocol with Regard
to Annex C, Group I, Substances (Hydrochlorofluorocarbons) (UN
Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.19/7, 21 September 2007).
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under consideration.34 Zaelke et al. discuss this pro-
posal, emphasizing the mitigation benefits it entails
and arguing that phasing out HFCs through the Mon-
treal Protocol would be the fastest and most cost-
effective solution.
Second, reducing local and regional air pollutants may
also result in climate change mitigation. ‘Traditional’
air pollutants, such as nitrogen oxide and sulphur
dioxide, and greenhouse gases often stem from the
same sources, such as transport, agriculture, power
production and industry. In addition, reducing short-
lived climate forcers such as black carbon and tropo-
spheric ozone can reduce regional climate impacts.35
The disaggregated ‘start and strengthen’ approach sug-
gested by Zaelke and colleagues to addressing small
pieces of the climate puzzle used to phase out fluori-
nated greenhouse gases could possibly be replicated by
other international, regional and national institutions.
This draws attention to the potential, for instance, of
the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pol-
lution,36 under whose umbrella a variety of protocols
has been adopted, most of which target specific air pol-
lutants. In May 2012, Parties to the 1999 Gothenburg
Protocol to the Convention37 agreed on a set of amend-
ments, one of which now includes black carbon within
the remit of the Protocol.38 Another venue where short-
lived climate forcers are discussed is the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), which is currently con-
sidering how to address black carbon emissions from
shipping that have an impact on warming in the Arctic
region.39 In addition to these traditional intergovern-
mental approaches, a new public–private partnership
has been established with a view to reducing short-lived
climate forcers – the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to
Reduce Short-lived Climate Pollutants40 – although it is
still too early to tell whether it will have a significant
impact on climate change mitigation. These targeted
approaches combined thus could result in significant
international and regional climate and development
benefits.
Third, tackling climate change and reducing biodiver-
sity loss are fundamentally related.41 Climate change
may have negative impacts on biodiversity, but the con-
servation of biodiversity may also support humans in
their efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change.
This means that various biodiversity-related regimes,
including the Convention on Biological Diversity42 and
the Ramsar Wetlands Convention,43 have a potential
role to play in addressing climate change. For instance,
given the fact that certain ecosystems (e.g., forests and
wetlands) have an important function as carbon sinks,44
measures to protect such ecosystems under biodiversity
treaties will have a knock-on effect for climate protec-
tion.45 In addition, from a cognitive viewpoint, interna-
tional biodiversity law can offer important lessons on
how to deal with the social and environmental impacts
of climate-related policies and measures.46 In this
regard it is notable that parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity agreed to issue a moratorium on
geo-engineering in 2010.47
34 S. Oberthür, C. Dupont and Y. Matsumoto, ‘Managing Policy Con-
tradictions between the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols: The Case of
Fluorinated Greenhouse Gases’, in: S. Oberthür and O.S. Stokke
(eds.), Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime Interplay and
Global Environmental Change (MIT Press, 2011), 115, at 128–129.
35 E. Rosenthal and R. Watson ‘Multilateral Efforts to Reduce Black
Carbon Emissions: A Lifeline for the Warming Arctic?’, 20:1 Review of
European Community and International Environmental Law (2011), 3.
36 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (Geneva,
13 November 1979; in force 16 March 1983).
37 Gothenburg Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and
Ground-level Ozone (Gothenburg, 30 November 1999; in force 17
May 2005).
38 See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE),
‘Parties to UNECE Air Pollution Convention Approve New Emission
Reduction Commitments for Main Air Pollutants by 2020’ (4 May
2012), found at: <http://www.unece.org/index.php?id=29858>.
39 L. Boone, ‘Reducing Air Pollution from Marine Vessels to Mitigate
Arctic Warming: Is it Time to Target Black Carbon?’, 6:1 Carbon and
Climate Law Review (2012), 13. See also E. Rosenthal and R.
Watson, n. 35 above, at 8–9.
40 See <http://www.unep.org/ccac/Home/tabid/101612/
Default.aspx>.
41 See, e.g., Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD), Interlinkages Between Biological Diversity and Climate
Change: Advice on the Integration of Biodiversity Considerations into
the Implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol, CBD Technical Series 10
(Secretariat of the CBD, 2003); Secretariat of the CBD, Connecting
Biodiversity and Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation: Report of
the Second Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Biodiversity and
Climate Change, CBD Technical Series 41 (Secretariat of the CBD,
2009).
42 Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992; in
force 29 December 1992).
43 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as
Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar, 2 February 1971; in force 21 December
1975).
44 Estimates indicate that tropical deforestation and forest degrada-
tion accounts for about 12–20% of global carbon dioxide emissions.
G. van der Werf et al., ‘CO2 Emissions from Forest Loss’, 2:11 Nature
Geoscience (2009), 737, at 737.
45 See further H. van Asselt, ‘Integrating Biodiversity in the Climate
Regime’s Forest Rules: Options and Tradeoffs in Greening REDD
Design’, 20:2 Review of European Community and International Envi-
ronmental Law, 139; E. Morgera, ‘Far Away, So Close: A Legal
Analysis of the Increasing Interactions between the Convention on
Biological Diversity and Climate Change Law’, 2:1 Climate Law, 85; J.
Pittock, ‘A Pale Reflection of Political Reality: Integration of Global
Climate, Wetland and Biodiversity Agreements’, 1:3 Climate Law
(2011), 343.
46 E. Morgera, ‘No Need to Reinvent the Wheel for a Human Rights-
based Approach to Tackling Climate Change: The Contribution
of International Biodiversity Law’, in: E.J. Hollo, K. Kulovesi and
M. Mehling (eds.), Climate Change and the Law (Springer, 2012,
forthcoming).
47 Decision X/33, Biodiversity and Climate Change (UN Doc. UNEP/
CBD/COP/10/27, 20 January 2011), at paragraph 8(w). See also
E. Morgera, n. 45 above, at 95–98.
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NATIONAL AND HUMAN
SECURITY INSTITUTIONS
Another realm of action explored in this special issue
relates to the nexus between climate change and
national and human security. It has been well docu-
mented that climate change and actions to curtail it
have deep effects on people, their governments, the
ecosystems on which they rely and the economies that
sustain their lives.48 We ask here whether institutions
charged with security can also, within their mandate,
help address climate change – particularly in the
context of growing awareness of increased stresses on
human ecological and economic environments caused
by climate change. We also ask whether such aware-
ness can mobilize people and institutions to address
climate change on the grounds that it threatens human
rights.
In her contribution, Scott examines the relationship
between climate change and national security – threats
to a State as a whole, and threats to people or their vital
resources such as food, water and land. She argues that
we are witnessing continued momentum towards the
full ‘securitization’ of climate change. ‘Securitization’
refers to ‘the process by which an issue comes to be
represented as not only a political problem but as an
existential threat to a valued referent object’. Scott ana-
lyzes the political prospects, merits and legal basis for
the ‘full securitization’ of climate change – a scenario in
which the UN Security Council would assume lead
responsibility for international climate policy, either
working in tandem with the UNFCCC process or even
supplanting the current approach. She notes the promi-
nence that the linkage between climate change and
security has gained at the UN Security Council over the
years, including in the Council’s 2011 Presidential state-
ment acknowledging the possible long-term negative
effects of climate change on peace and security.49
However, she also observes that – with the exception of
small island developing States – developing countries
have been largely opposed to discussing climate change
in the Security Council. Scott invites us to think pro-
vocatively and creatively about the role that the Council
could play to support people’s efforts to mitigate and
adapt to climate change. She notes, for example, that
notwithstanding likely political opposition to this idea,
there are technically no legal obstacles to the UN Secu-
rity Council ‘identify[ing] climate change as a threat to
peace and impos[ing] legally binding obligations on any
or all States in order to meet that threat’.
The contribution by Cameron and Limon reflects on the
intersection of climate change and human rights.
Drawing on the experience of small island developing
States, as well as recent decisions, reports and proce-
dures of the UNFCCC and the Human Rights Council,
they note how climate change could jeopardize several
internationally protected human rights and that the
international recognition of the linkages between
climate change and human rights is growing. Cameron
and Limon identify various tools provided by the inter-
national human rights framework that could support
the fight against climate change. These include the
power, through a human rights narrative, to mobilize
people and countries in favour of more ambitious
action. Human Rights Council mechanisms, including
Special Procedures and the Universal Periodic Review,
could also apply greater pressure on the world’s major
greenhouse gas emitters. The authors also explore the
near-term opportunity of a new Special Procedure – the
recent creation of an Independent Expert on the issue
of human rights obligations related to the enjoyment of
a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment.
Despite these opportunities, they note that greater legal
clarity would expand the toolbox further – in particular,
on the human-rights-related duties and obligations of
States and the extraterritorial dimensions of human
rights. Finally, Cameron and Limon note important
potential synergies between the human rights regime
and the UNFCCC. Among other elements, they discuss
the potential for the UNFCCC to learn from the Univer-
sal Periodic Review as climate experts and governments
refine and implement measurement, reporting and
verification procedures for greenhouse gas emissions
and climate actions.
ECONOMIC AND TRADE
INSTITUTIONS
International economic institutions and the incentives
and capital flows they generate are of major impor-
tance in tackling climate change for various reasons.
The transition to a low-carbon economy will require
major investments in key sectors through the mobili-
zation of a range of sources and financial institutions.
In Cancún, developed nations pledged to mobilize
US$100 billion annually by 2020 and established the
Green Climate Fund, which will channel a portion of
these resources.50 While this can be seen as an impor-
tant step forward on the part of the UNFCCC, the
majority of climate-related financial flows is expected
to stem from institutions outside the direct control of
the UNFCCC – for instance, multilateral development
banks, bilateral agencies, export crediting agencies,
foreign direct investment and domestic expenditures.51
Estimates of the annual mitigation financing needs of
48 See, e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. A Contribution of Working
Groups I, II, and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press,
2007); World Bank, World Development Report 2010: Development
and Climate Change (World Bank, 2010).
49 United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the
Security Council (UN Doc. S/PRST/2011/15, 20 July 2011).
50 Decision 1/CP.16, n. 6 above, at paragraph 98.
51 See, e.g., World Bank, n. 48 above, at Chapter 6.
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developing countries range from over US$200 billion
to US$500 billion annually by the year 2030, suggest-
ing that the UNFCCC’s Green Climate Fund will
provide an important, but only partial, contribution to
the needs of developing countries.52 Part of the focus
should therefore be on integrating climate change con-
siderations into the activities of bilateral and multilat-
eral development banks as well as on incentivizing
private sector investment in low-carbon technologies
and infrastructure. This concerns not only dedicated
climate funds such as the Climate Investment Funds
administered by the World Bank, but also the integra-
tion of climate considerations into ‘core’ activities and
development funds, which multilateral development
banks have not done consistently in the past.53 Fur-
thermore, the effective allocation of climate finance
raises important considerations around the gover-
nance of the various climate-related funds, including
the decision-making power of contributors and recipi-
ents and a framework for prioritizing the allocation of
limited resources among competing priorities.54
Second, international economic law can both constrain
and enable climate action. In this regard, the main
focus (of both the policy-making and academic com-
munities) has been on the role of the World Trade
Organization (WTO).55 There has been much discus-
sion about the ways in which the WTO exerts a nega-
tive influence on climate law and policy. This includes
its potential ‘chilling’ effect on the climate treaties,
referring to the fact that parties to the climate regime
have refrained from adopting multilateral trade mea-
sures – for instance, against non-compliers or non-
parties.56 In addition, there have been concerns about
the compatibility of a host of domestic trade measures
with various provisions of WTO law. In recent years,
this discussion has largely centred on the use of border
carbon adjustments, following proposals tabled in both
the European Union and the United States.57 Although
the legality of such measures under WTO law remains
disputed, and will depend on their eventual design, it
is notable that countries have sought to ensure that
measures are WTO-compatible.58 In addition, clean
energy subsidies have increasingly been challenged
under the WTO, with potential consequences for
investments in more sustainable energy infrastruc-
ture.59 While WTO law may thus seem to constrain
climate ambitions, attention has increasingly shifted to
ways that the organization might contribute to climate
change mitigation. One of these options is pursuing
the reduction of fossil fuel subsidies,60 as called for by
the G20 in 2010.61 Another avenue is the liberalization
of trade in climate-friendly goods and services.62 While
progress on these issues has been slow and achieving
consensus will likely remain challenging, they never-
theless show the potential for the WTO and other eco-
nomic institutions to contribute to climate change
mitigation.
MINILATERAL INSTITUTIONS
In addition to mobilizing existing multilateral institu-
tions, States have become increasingly engaged in cre-
ating and using minilateral institutions in the fight
against climate change. A key idea behind minilateral
institutions is that it is easier to get to agreement among
a smaller number of like-minded countries than through
52 Ibid., at Table 6.2
53 S. Nakhooda and A. Ballesteros, Investing in Sustainable Energy
Futures (World Resources Institute, 2010).
54 See, e.g., A. Ballesteros, S. Nakhooda, J. Werksman and K. Hurl-
burt, ‘Power, Responsibility and Accountability: Rethinking the Legiti-
macy of Institutions for Climate Finance’, 1:2 Climate Law (2010),
261; A. Ghosh, Harnessing the Power Shift: Governance Options for
International Climate Financing (Oxfam, 2010).
55 See, e.g., M. Doelle, ‘Climate Change and the WTO: Opportunities
to Motivate State Action on Climate Change through the World Trade
Organization’, 13:1 Review of European Community and International
Environmental Law (2004), 85; G.C. Hufbauer, S. Charnovitz and J.
Kim, Global Warming and the World Trading System (Peterson Insti-
tute for International Economics, 2009); L. Tamiotti et al., Trade and
Climate Change: A Report by the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme and the World Trade Organization (WTO Secretariat, 2009);
T. Epps and A. Green, Reconciling Trade and Climate: How the WTO
can Help Address Climate Change (Edward Elgar, 2010); F. Zelli and
H. van Asselt, ‘The Overlap Between the UN Climate Regime and the
World Trade Organization: Lessons for Post-2012 Climate Gover-
nance’, in: F. Biermann, P. Pattberg and F. Zelli (eds.), Global
Climate Governance Beyond 2012: Architecture, Agency and Adap-
tation (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 79.
56 Cf. R. Eckersley, ‘The Big Chill: The WTO and Multilateral Environ-
mental Agreements’, 4:2 Global Environmental Politics (2004), 24.
57 See, e.g., F. Biermann and R. Brohm, ‘Implementing the Kyoto
Protocol without the United States: The Strategic Role of Energy Tax
Adjustments at the Border’, 4:3 Climate Policy (2005), 289; J. de
Cendra de Larragán, ‘Can Emissions Trading Schemes be Coupled
with Border Tax Adjustments?: An Analysis vis-à-vis WTO Law’, 15:2
Review of European Community and International Environmental
Law (2006), 131; R. Ismer and K. Neuhoff, ‘Border Tax Adjustment: A
Feasible Way to Support Stringent Emission Trading’, 24:2 European
Journal of Law and Economics (2007), 137; J. Pauwelyn, US Federal
Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and
Options of International Trade Law (Nicholas Institute for Environ-
mental Policy, 2007); L. Tamiotti, ‘The Legal Interface between
Carbon Border Measures and Trade Rules’, 11:5 Climate Policy
(2011), 1202. For a discussion of the measures proposed in the EU
and the United States, see H. van Asselt and T.L. Brewer, ‘Address-
ing Competitiveness and Leakage Concerns in Climate Policy: An
Analysis of Border Adjustment Measures in the US and the EU’, 38:1
Energy Policy (2010), 42.
58 See, e.g., H. van Asselt and T.L. Brewer, n. 57 above, at 45.
59 A. Ghosh and H. Gangania, Governing Clean Energy Subsidies:
What, Why and How Legal? (International Centre for Trade and
Sustainable Development (ICTSD), 2012).
60 A. Green, ‘Trade Rules and Climate Change Subsidies’, 5:3 World
Trade Review (2006), 377, at 381; S.Z. Bigdeli, ‘Will the “Friends of
Climate” Emerge in the WTO? The Prospects of Applying the “Fish-
eries Subsidies” Model to Energy Subsidies’, 2:1 Carbon and Climate
Law Review (2008), 78.
61 Pittsburgh Summit Declaration, found at: <http://www.g20.org/
images/stories/docs/eng/pittsburgh.pdf>, at paragraph 24.
62 These take place under the Doha Round of trade negotiations. See
Doha Ministerial Declaration (WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20
November 2001), at paragraph 31(iii).
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a multilateral negotiation process.63 Kulovesi’s contri-
bution to this special issue contrasts minilateral
approaches with unilateral andmultilateral ones, focus-
ing on greenhouse gas emissions from two sectors: avia-
tion and shipping. Emissions from these areas are in
principle covered by two international organizations –
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
and the IMO, respectively.64 However, as Kulovesi notes
inher contribution, only limitedprogresshasbeenmade
in these forums, and discussions about the possible use
of market-based measures in these sectors have been
mired in controversy. The lack of progress in ICAO has
led to further action outside the UNFCCC aimed at
reducingaviationemissions: the inclusionof these emis-
sions in the EU’s emissions trading system.65 The move
by the EU has been heavily criticized by other govern-
ments (including those of China, India and the United
States) and airlines in those countries as being an unjus-
tified unilateral, extraterritorial measure that allegedly
violates both international trade law and international
climate law.66 However, Kulovesi argues that the debate
should not get stuck in arguments aboutwhether the EU
measure is extraterritorial, but that attention should
shift towards the conditions under which such minilat-
eral initiatives could help to contribute to avoiding dan-
gerous climate change while respecting the rules,
principles and procedures agreed under the climate
regime. This recommendation is premised on the belief
that the integration of these widely held principles
would lead to greater acceptance and perhaps replica-
tionofminilateral initiatives like theEU’s andultimately
trigger greater collective ambition. Of course, it is
unclear whether even this step would be sufficient to
overcome the principled opposition by some countries
to thede factooutsourcing of certain policies to a sub-set
of countries in the face of a multilateral roadblock.
Nonetheless, Kulovesi’s recommended approach can be
seen as a constructive attempt to move beyond a cur-
rently boisterous debate while aiming for greater emis-
sion reductions.
The contribution by Weischer, Morgan and Patel
focuses on a different group of minilateral institutions,
and reflects on the power of trade and finance as
incentives for countries to pursue more ambitious
climate policies. They identify opportunities for ‘trans-
formational clubs’ that could be established outside of
the auspices of the climate and trade regimes. Their
argument builds on a recent body of literature that has
sought to identify the potential of minilateral ‘clubs’.67
Various clubs have emerged in the past few years, and
Weischer and colleagues identify and compare 17 of
them. They note how some clubs are focused on fos-
tering dialogue (e.g., the Major Economies Forum),
whereas others are rather implementation-oriented
(e.g., the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency
Partnership). However, they argue that ‘the current
configuration of these clubs is not focused on signifi-
cantly increased ambition’. They further contend that
while climate clubs to date have created incremental
change, they have not catalyzed the speed and scale
required to solve the problem. Building on other pro-
posals that consider how smaller groupings could
enable greater ambition, such as a Sustainable Energy
Trade Agreement68 and a feed-in-tariff club,69 the
authors move on to argue that a climate club could be
formed that would be ‘transformational’ if: its
members reaped significant benefits; its membership
were linked to a degree of climate ambition; benefits
were distributed evenly across all members; and the
benefits would be generated in a way that would
respect existing international law. Trade-related
incentives for joining such a club could help make par-
ticipation in a transformational club attractive, and
Weischer et al. provide a novel list of possible ele-
ments of a ‘low-carbon union’ that countries could
pursue.
DYNAMICS OF THE EMERGING
REGIME COMPLEX
The previous section shows that international institu-
tions in various policy fields have made or could make a
significant contribution to mobilizing climate action.
Beyond this important acknowledgement, questions
arise about how these institutions relate to the
UNFCCC, what role the UNFCCC has to play in this
emerging regime complex, and how the institutions
could come to an appropriate division of labour that
makes use of their respective strengths. This section
explores these questions.
63 See, e.g., M. Naím, n. 9 above.
64 Kyoto Protocol, n. 17 above, Article 2.2.
65 Directive 2008/101 of the European Parliament and of the Euro-
pean Council Amending Directive 2003/87 so as to Include Aviation
Activities in the Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance
Trading within the Community, [2009] OJ L8/3.
66 See, e.g., L. Bartels, ‘The WTO Legality of the Application of the
EU’s Emission Trading System to Aviation’, 23:2 European Journal of
International Law (2012), 429; J. Scott and L. Rajamani, ‘EU Climate
Change Unilateralism’, 23:2 European Journal of International Law
(2012), 469.
67 On climate ‘clubs’, see, e.g., D.G. Victor, ‘Plan B for Copenhagen’,
461:7262 Nature (2009), 342; D.G. Victor, n. 24 above, at 242–243.
Existing club proposals have been criticized by, e.g., J.S. McGee, n.
9 above, and R. Eckersley, n. 9 above. For a discussion of how the
trade negotiations model of minilateralism could work in international
climate policy, see A. Ghosh, Making Climate Look Like Trade?
Questions on Incentives, Flexibility and Credibility (Centre for Policy
Research, 2010), at 3–4.
68 ICTSD, Fostering Low Carbon Growth: The Case for a Sustainable
Energy Trade Agreement (ICTSD, November 2011).
69 Germany Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), World in
Transition: A Social Contract for Sustainability (WBGU, 2011).
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THE RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE UNFCCC
The relationship between the UNFCCC and other inter-
national institutions is difficult to classify as either con-
flicting or synergistic.70 As the previous section showed,
there is ample room for other institutions to contribute
to climate change goals. However, the emergence of
new fora to discuss climate change policy in the mid-
2000s equally showed that non-UNFCCC institutions
may also by design or de facto challenge the UNFCCC
process by creating a ‘strategic inconsistency’71. For
instance, two of the clubs discussed by Weischer and
colleagues – the (now-defunct) Asia-Pacific Partner-
ship on Clean Development and Climate and the Major
Economies Forum – have been described as attempts
by the former US Administration under President
George W. Bush to change the course of international
climate policy established by the Kyoto Protocol.72 This
sceptical view is increasingly supplemented by the idea
that other institutions are not only able to contribute to
the UNFCCC’s objective, but are also necessary to
achieve this objective.73
New coalitions of developed and developing countries
are emerging that believe that pursuing options outside
the UNFCCC need not be done to the detriment of the
climate regime. For example, Scott discusses how in
recent years several countries have gradually become
more supportive of a role for the Security Council on
climate change issues. In July 2011, the EU, the United
States and small island developing States voiced
support for an active role by the Council on climate
change, even if India, Venezuela and other members of
the G77 remained reluctant. Similarly, driven in no
small part by the small island developing States, a coa-
lition of countries within the human rights system
advocated for the recognition of the linkages between
human rights and climate change, although they faced
resistance from countries that believed that climate
change should be dealt with exclusively under the
UNFCCC. Since 2008, several resolutions and reports
related to climate change have been adopted and com-
missioned unanimously under the auspices of the
Human Rights Council and the Office of the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights. As another example, the
recently formed Climate and Clean Air Coalition brings
together developed and developing country govern-
ments, as well as various non-State actors.74
While it is noteworthy that more and more countries
are open to the involvement of other international insti-
tutions in the fight against climate change, some coun-
tries remain generally reluctant to outsource certain
decisions about how to address climate change to insti-
tutions other than the UNFCCC. This reluctance can
derive from legitimate concerns that should be
acknowledged and discussed, and could possibly be
addressed without restricting climate action to the con-
fines of the UNFCCC. Referring to the inclusion of avia-
tion emissions in the EU emissions trading scheme,
Kulovesi’s article shows that countries remain suspi-
cious of minilateral initiatives outside of the multilat-
eral framework of the UNFCCC. Importantly, she notes
a possible condition that could make such initiatives
more acceptable: compatibility with ‘relevant interna-
tional legal rules and principles’. But what makes inter-
national rules and principles ‘relevant’? Arguably, the
aviation dispute points to the importance of respecting
the principle of common but differentiated responsi-
bilities and respective capabilities.75 The importance of
this principle is also underlined by Zaelke et al., who
note its role in the Montreal Protocol. However, the
precise contents of this principle remain contested and
are the subject of continued discussions within the
UNFCCC itself.76 Kulovesi also underlines the impor-
tance of fostering dialogue among countries on mea-
sures, like the one adopted by the EU, that are the
subject of discord – for example, under the auspices of
the forum on the impact of the implementation of
response measures of the UNFCCC.77
Meanwhile, Scott uncovers concerns specific to the
realm of international security. In particular, she notes
that some countries fear inappropriate military
70 See S. Oberthür, n. 16 above, at 73.
71 See K. Raustiala and D. Victor, n. 7 above, at 298.
72 See, e.g., H. van Asselt, ‘From UN-ity to Diversity? The UNFCCC,
the Asia-Pacific Partnership and the Future of International Law on
Climate Change’, 1:1 Carbon and Climate Law Review (2007), 17; J.
McGee and R. Taplin, ‘The Role of the Asia-Pacific Partnership in
Discursive Contestation of the International Climate Regime’, 9:3
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Econom-
ics (2009), 213; A. Vihma, ‘Friendly Neighbor or Trojan Horse?
Assessing the Interaction of Soft Law Initiatives and the UN Climate
Regime’, 9:3 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law
and Economics (2009), 239.
73 See n. 8 above.
74 See Climate and Clean Air Coalition, Country Partners, found at:
<http://www.unep.org/ccac/Actors/CountryPartners.aspx>.
75 See J. Scott and L. Rajamani, n. 66 above. Similar arguments have
been made with respect to the use of border carbon adjustments. See
M. Hertel, ‘Climate-change-related Trade Measures and Article XX:
Defining Discrimination in Light of the Principle of Common but Dif-
ferentiated Responsibilities’, 45:3 Journal of World Trade (2011), 653;
S. Davidson Ladly, ‘Border Carbon Adjustments, WTO-law and the
Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’, 12:1 Inter-
national Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics
(2012), 63.
76 For example, parties in Durban called for the organization of a
workshop on ‘equitable access to sustainable development’. See
Decision 2/CP.17, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (UN
Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 15 March 2012), paragraph 4. Some
observers believe that the principle is evolving slowly towards a
greater level of symmetry between developed and developing coun-
tries. For recent discussions, see, e.g., L. Rajamani, n. 18 above; and
L. Rajamani, n. 23 above.
77 See Decision 8/CP/17, Forum and Work Programme on the Impact
of the Implementation of Response Measures (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/
2011/9/Add.2, 15 March 2012), at paragraph 3.
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responses to climate change. She also gathers that there
may be relatively greater openness among States to
assigning a role to the Security Council with respect to
the impacts of climate change rather than greenhouse
gas emission reductions. The solutions to these con-
cerns are as yet unclear but they should hardly be
grounds for categorically dismissing any involvement
on the part of the Security Council. Rather, the unease
expressed by countries could be addressed, for
example, by articulating a limited and well-defined role
for the Council. Opposition has also been raised in the
clubs contexts, based on the belief that the limited
membership of smaller fora make them less legitimate
than the UNFCCC.78 Furthermore, in most of the cases
reviewed in the special issue, concerns have been
relayed that giving a greater role to another institution
would disempower and marginalize the UNFCCC. Such
concerns might be allayed by an affirmation by all
actors involved in these other institutions that the
UNFCCC should continue to play a central role. For
example, the UN Security Council could emphasize in
future declarations and decisions that it does not seek
to replace the UNFCCC and that it intends to defer to it,
particularly with regard to decisions where the partici-
pation of all countries is necessary to achieve greater
buy-in and legitimacy.
Last but not least, several developing countries fear that
developed countries are turning to other fora to shirk
their responsibilities for reducing emissions under the
UNFCCC as an instance of forum-shopping.79 However,
this concern might dissipate if developed countries
demonstrate how these other fora can lead to greater
mitigation on their part, and if they demonstrate real
leadership under the UNFCCC itself. Standardized pro-
cedures for tracking and quantifying the estimated
mitigation benefits of initiatives outside the UNFCCC
might also lead to a greater degree of confidence that
these ancillary efforts are truly supplemental to the
existing pledges under the UNFCCC rather than a mere
duplicative distraction. As Weischer et al. note with
respect to club formation outside of the UNFCCC, coun-
tries establishing a transformational club may be able
to bring ambition back in to the UNFCCC. Whether
such conditions will be sufficient to make actions
outside the UNFCCC acceptable to all countries
remains to be seen, but we would argue that these basic
conditions are likely to be necessary.
THE ROLE OF THE UNFCCC
We believe that the UNFCCC should remain a central
actor in the regime complex for climate change and that
negotiators need to play their part and step up for
several reasons. The first reason is related to procedural
equity: under the UNFCCC, all parties – in principle –
have a chance to help shape international climate
policy. Of course, the absence of voting rules can be
used by one country or a small minority to block the
adoption of ambitious decisions that enjoy support
from an overwhelming majority of parties.80 The con-
sensus requirement can thus, in some cases, lead to the
adoption of texts in line with the lowest common
denominator.81 However, the same requirement also
guarantees that vulnerable communities that otherwise
do not participate in smaller fora, such as the G20, are
represented and that the final outcome reflects their
concerns. This dynamic was at play in the Copenhagen
and Cancún COPs, where the reference to a mitigation
goal of 1.5°C average warming was preserved at the
insistence of the small island developing States.
Second, the principles of the UNFCCC are cherished by
many that seek to ensure that any response to climate
change is substantively equitable and consistent with
the principle of common but differentiated responsi-
bilities and respective capabilities. Because the prin-
ciple of CBDRRC sometimes seems to be the cause for
gridlock in the UNFCCC negotiations, it can be tempt-
ing to obviate it by negotiating through another insti-
tution. However, it may be possible to embrace a
dynamic interpretation of this principle that guaran-
tees ambition while respecting countries’ legitimate
equity concerns.82
Third, from this procedural and substantive equity
flows legitimacy, which ensures wide buy-in into the
decisions of the UNFCCC.83
Fourth, the UNFCCC’s wide membership and mandate
make it arguably best placed to fulfil certain key func-
tions in the regime complex.84 In particular, we believe
it should continue to play an important role in articu-
lating a shared vision of the overall goals of interna-
tional climate policy. The UNFCCC need not be the only
78 See R. Eckersley, n. 9 above.
79 On this concern, see generally E. Benvenisti and G.W. Downs, ‘The
Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of
International Law’, 60:2 Stanford Law Review (2007), 595; D.W.
Drezner, ‘The Power and Peril of International Regime Complexity’,
7:1 Perspectives on Politics (2009), 65.
80 See D.G. Victor, n. 24 above, at 211–212.
81 See J. Depledge and F. Yamin, n. 2 above, at 447. Some countries
and observers have proposed solutions to this problem. See Letter
dated 26 May 2011 from Papua New Guinea and Mexico Addressed
to the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (26 May 2011), found at: <http://unfccc.int/
files/parties_and_observers/notifications/application/pdf/
nv_parties_20110603.pdf>; A. Vihma and K. Kulovesi, Strengthening
Global Climate Change Negotiations: Improving the Efficiency of the
UNFCCC Process (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2012).
82 A variety of approaches have been advanced for rethinking the
concept of CBDRRC, for instance by focusing on differentiation with
respect to the implementation and review of commitments and finan-
cial and technological assistance. See, e.g., S. Jinnah and D.
Bushey, ‘Evolving Responsibility: The Principle of Common but Dif-
ferentiated Responsibility in the UNFCCC’, 6 Berkeley Journal of
International Law Publicist (2010), 1.
83 See also R. Eckersley, n. 9 above, at 33–34.
84 See A. Vihma and H. van Asselt, n. 2 above, at 6–7.
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institution working to implement this vision, but it can
be a catalyst for other international institutions. The
UNFCCC also has a vital role to play in tracking
progress against global and national goals. A central-
ized and standardized set of measurement, reporting
and verification procedures is essential to guarantee
that greenhouse gas emissions, as well as individual and
global performance are tracked comprehensively and
uniformly.
Finally, one may point to the institutional knowledge
and capacity of the UNFCCC to argue that forsaking and
rebuilding its legal rules, operational procedures and
technical expertise elsewhere would take more time
than the climate can afford and would be a non-starter
for many countries. In terms of rules and procedures, a
key example is the extensive modalities and procedures
developed for the Kyoto Protocol’s market-based
mechanisms.85 In terms of technical expertise, the
UNFCCC Secretariat operates on a budget of approxi-
mately €25 million/year86 and employs over 500 expert
staff.87 The UNFCCC also enjoys a broad legal mandate
through the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and asso-
ciated COP decisions to adopt a very wide range of
measures to coordinate and impose specific and legally
binding measures on individual countries to address
climate change, as well as to set and track global goals.
In many ways, the limits to the UNFCCC’s power to
effect change to date have been political rather than
legal. Yet this legal basis is a sine qua non for a fully
functioning regime complex for climate change and it is
unlikely to be replicated in another institution within a
meaningful timeframe. Therefore, we would argue that
it is essential that the UNFCCC continue to play a
central role in the regime complex, including by deliv-
ering on the Durban Platform for closing the ambition
gap in the near term.
NAVIGATING REGIME
COMPLEXITY THROUGH
COORDINATION
Although the various institutions discussed in this
special issue could play a positive role in the fight
against climate change, we have also reviewed argu-
ments for keeping the UNFCCC at the centre of a
constellation of international institutions. Such
co-existence requires us to think about how best to
ensure effective coordination between the UNFCCC and
these other international institutions.88 The arguments
in favour of coordination are related to efficiency, com-
petence, legal authority and legitimacy. Efficiency
requires that institutions with authority over a similar
issue coordinate their actions in order to avoid duplica-
tion and maximize policy coherence.89 For instance,
several of the implementation-oriented clubs discussed
by Weischer and colleagues undertake activities aimed
at promoting the development and transfer of climate-
friendly technologies that partially overlap. Creating
within each of these clubs separate rules and guidance
for achieving this goal may lead to inefficiencies and
contradictions. Competence suggests that a division of
labour should be set based on the technical expertise
and institutional capacity of the institutions in ques-
tion. Zaelke and colleagues illustrate this argument by
describing the extensive experience of the Montreal
Protocol with respect to reducing HFC emissions. Dif-
ferent institutions often also have legal authority to act
on different aspects of a given matter and need to work
together to achieve a greater collective result. Cameron
and Limon explain this when they argue that the
UNFCCC should take over where the Human Rights
Council left off. As they put it: ‘[T]he Human Rights
Council played a key role in introducing [human rights]
principles into the UNFCCC process but is not able, for
institutional reasons, to play a significant role in opera-
tionalizing them.’ From a legitimacy standpoint,
greater coordination can help build trust and accep-
tance of decisions and outputs produced both by the
UNFCCC and other institutions with which Parties wish
to work.90 For example, within a span of two years, at
least four reports were written by regional or interna-
tional institutions on the potential of innovative sources
of finance to support mitigation and adaptation in
developing countries.91 While this may be partly
85 For instance, a Clean Development Mechanism rulebook was
developed to assist interested parties in navigating the extensive
and detailed rules of the mechanism. See <http://www.cdmrulebook.
org/>.
86 Decision 18/CP.17, Programme Budget for the Biennium 2012–
2013 (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.2, 15 March 2012).
87 Fact Sheet: UNFCCC Secretariat (February 2011), found at:
<http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/
unfccc_secretariat.pdf>. See also C. Bausch and M. Mehling, n. 8
above, at 20.
88 See H. van Asselt and F. Zelli, n. 25 above.
89 Cf. E. Brown Weiss, ‘International Environmental Law: Contempo-
rary Issues and the Emergence of a New Order’. 81:3 Georgetown
Law Journal (1993), 675, at 697.
90 For a similar argument related to the legitimacy of the WTO, see K.
Kulovesi, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Challenges of the
Environment, Legitimacy and Fragmentation (Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, 2011). A counter-argument is that a plurality of institutions
could actually further the legitimacy of each institution, for instance,
because institutions act as each other’s safety net, or because they
appeal to and involve different groups of stakeholders. In the context
of natural resource management at the national level, this argument
of ‘redundancy’ has been made by B. Low, E. Ostrom, C. Simon and
J. Wilson, ‘Redundancy and Diversity: Do They Influence Optimal
Management?’, in: F. Berkes, J. Colding and C. Folke (eds.), Navi-
gating Social-ecological Systems: Building Resilience for Complexity
and Change (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 83. For a similar
argument in the context of international environmental governance,
see P. Haas, ‘Addressing the Global Governance Deficit’, 4:4 Global
Environmental Politics (2004), 1, at 3.
91 M. Zenawi et al., Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Advi-
sory Group on Climate Change Financing (United Nations, 2010);
European Commission, Scaling up International Climate Finance
after 2012 (European Commission, 2011); UNEP, Innovative Climate
Finance: Examples from the UNEP Bilateral Finance Institutions
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explained by an attempt to gain a diversity of perspec-
tive and expertise, lack of coordination and a belief that
certain bodies did not have the necessary legitimacy
were likely contributing factors to this proliferation.
On a practical level, there are various ways in which the
UNFCCC and other institutions can work together.92
For instance, Memoranda of Understanding or Memo-
randa of Cooperation, used regularly by other interna-
tional environmental institutions,93 and also by the
UNFCCC with respect to the Global Environment Facil-
ity,94 could be employed to regulate the relationship
with other multilateral institutions.95 Another option
would be to promote active mutual observership. While
observership is the rule rather than the exception in
most international institutions, there are still some
obstacles. In this regard, Cameron and Limon discuss
the difficulty faced based by the Office of the High Com-
missioner on Human Rights in past attempts to mean-
ingfully participate in UNFCCC COP meetings.
Conversely, there is still some resistance to observer-
ship of the UNFCCC Secretariat – as well as other mul-
tilateral environmental agreements – at the Special
Sessions of the WTO’s Committee on Trade and Envi-
ronment, in which trade negotiations of immediate rel-
evance for the environment are conducted.96 Related to
observership is the exchange of information. So far,
information exchange between the UNFCCC and other
institutions takes place largely on an ad hoc basis or
relies on the submissions of individual parties rather
than through regular reporting on the part of the insti-
tution’s administrative bodies. More frequent and com-
prehensive reporting – for instance, by implementation
clubs – could enhance transparency and predictability
by showing how – and possibly howmuch – the actions
of other institutions contribute to the UNFCCC’s objec-
tive.97 While it may be difficult to quantify precisely how
many emission reductions these other initiatives will
yield, it may be possible to quantify some of the infor-
mation (e.g., HFC emission reductions under the Mon-
treal Protocol). Finally, there is room for enhanced
inter-institutional learning.98 The UNFCCC and other
international institutions sometimes conduct activities
that are similar in nature. Consequently, they have the
potential to learn from each other on a procedural level.
Cameron and Limon give us the example of review pro-
cedures within the UNFCCC and the Universal Periodic
Review, but others could be explored.99
Clearly, achieving greater coordination in the regime
complex for climate change is not without challenges.
One key question that is likely to emerge is where the
authority lies to allocate responsibility for action to one
institution over another. Once principles for coordina-
tion and a division of labour have been laid out, such as
the ones discussed above, who will be the arbiter? There
is no straightforward answer to these questions, and
solutions will likely lie in the eye of the beholder. More-
over, in some cases, coordination would be challenging
because parties intentionally sought to take climate-
related issues elsewhere. A clear instance is the creation
of several clubs by the United States in the 2000s (fol-
lowing its departure from Kyoto). In other words, the
feasibility of coordination is undermined if countries
pursue forum-shopping – or forum-creating – strate-
gies. Finally, institutions with similar, partially overlap-
ping mandates may sometimes be more inclined to
compete for authority, recognition and financial
resources than to delegate power in the broader pursuit
of overarching goals. Although widespread coordina-
tion may thus face obstacles and take time, one can
begin with the ‘low-hanging fruit’, such as active
observership and regular information exchange, and
gradually aspire to build a more elaborate and compre-
hensive network.
CONCLUSIONS AND WAYS
FORWARD
With this introduction to the special issue, we have
sought to make the case that action beyond the
UNFCCC is likely to be necessary to enhance mitigation
ambition. In addition, we have drawn attention to,
and reflected upon, the role of the UNFCCC in the
regime complex for climate change. From the various
Climate Change Working Group (UNEP, 2011); World Bank Group,
Mobilizing Climate Finance: A Paper Prepared at the Request of G20
Finance Ministers (World Bank, 2011).
92 Cf. H. van Asselt, ‘Legal and Political Approaches in Interplay
Management: Dealing with the Fragmentation of Global Climate Gov-
ernance’, in S. Oberthür and O.S. Stokke, n. 34 above, 59, at 75–77.
93 W.B. Chambers, Interlinkages and the Effectiveness of Multilateral
Environmental Agreements (United Nations University Press, 2008),
at 66–67; K.N. Scott, ‘International Environmental Governance: Man-
aging Fragmentation through Institutional Connection’, 12:1 Mel-
bourne Journal of International Law (2011), 177, at 192–200.
94 Decision 12/CP.2, Memorandum of Understanding between the
Conference of the Parties and the Council of the Global Environment
Facility (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1, 29 October 1996).
95 See, e.g., H. van Asselt, J. Gupta and F. Biermann, n. 15 above, at
264.
96 S. Jinnah, ‘Overlap Management in the World Trade Organization:
Secretariat Influence on Trade-environment Politics’, 10:2 Global
Environmental Politics (2010), 64, at 67–68.
97 Cf. H. van Asselt, n. 72 above, at 26. See also D. Tirpak, A.
Ronquillo-Ballesteros, K. Stasio and H. McGray, Guidelines for
Reporting Information on Climate Finance (World Resources Insti-
tute, 2010), in which the authors argue that multilateral development
banks could be asked to report to the UNFCCC on the climate finance
they provide so as to achieve more comprehensive and harmonized
reporting of the support provided to developing countries.
98 See, e.g., O.S. Stokke, The Interplay of International Regimes:
Putting Effectiveness Theory to Work?, FNI Report 10/2001 (Fridtjof
Nansen Institute, 2001), at 20–23; W.B. Chambers, n. 93 above, at
146.
99 See, e.g., R. Greenspan Bell and M.S. Ziegler (eds.), Building
International Climate Cooperation: Lessons from the Weapons and
Trade Regime for Achieving International Climate Goals (World
Resources Institute, 2012).
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contributions to this special issue, as well as the wider
literature, some overarching findings emerge.
First, we have shown that international institutions
outside of the UNFCCC – both existing and new –
can play an important part in complementing the
UNFCCC’s efforts to achieve greater ambition.
Although most existing international institutions
outside the UNFCCC have contributed only modestly to
climate goals to date, we have seen that several institu-
tions could be enhanced to reach their full potential.
Certain institutions are smaller, involve like-minded
‘climate-friendly’ countries in the form of coalitions, or
have a useful track record at reaching decisions involv-
ing a large number of countries. In addition, multiple
specialized venues can each address a small piece of a
puzzle that the UNFCCC could not tackle as a whole.
Other institutions may also be better able to mobilize
national governments and constituencies that have
remained silent or resistant – for example, by framing
climate impacts and policies in terms of human rights
or national security. The special issue notes in particu-
lar the potential to draw upon international environ-
mental, human rights, security and economic
institutions, as well as the potential of ‘minilateral’
venues such as transformational clubs.
Second, although new country coalitions are pursuing
options outside the UNFCCC, it should be acknowl-
edged that there is still reluctance among some coun-
tries to cede authority on climate-related issues to other
institutions. This reluctance may stem from legitimate
concerns and fears related to a lack of respect of the
UNFCCC’s core principles, decision making by a select
few countries that does not take into account the inter-
ests of other countries, or forum-shopping behaviour.
However, these concerns could be addressed if the
activities of other international institutions were dis-
cussed more publicly, and if the work of other institu-
tions were clearly linked to that of the UNFCCC.
Third, although other institutions can make an impor-
tant contribution to climate change mitigation, we find
that the UNFCCC should continue to play a central role.
The reasons for this are both principled and practical.
In terms of principles, the UNFCCC enjoys a high level
of legitimacy, as the consensus requirement ensures
that smaller countries still have a voice in the process,
and because its principles (including notably CBDRRC)
are aimed at steering parties towards a substantively
equitable outcome. In terms of practice, the UNFCCC
carries out important functions, such as creating a
shared vision, tracking progress through measuring,
reporting and verification, and sharing knowledge and
experiences. Furthermore, over the last two decades the
UN climate regime has painstakingly built significant
financial and technical capacity and developed detailed
rules and procedures with respect to various aspects of
climate policy. Similarly, the UNFCCC’s legal authority
and broad mandate to develop and oversee legally
binding national climate actions is unparalleled and
likely difficult to replicate in a timely manner.
Fourth, we have shown that it is important to conceive
of ways for the UNFCCC and other institutions to col-
laborate. The discourse, research and practice are
increasingly shifting from a fear that action outside the
UNFCCC will undermine the climate negotiations to
one where all relevant institutions and actors can work
together in a mutually supportive manner. The
UNFCCC could be at the centre of this broad constella-
tion and act as a catalyst for action by other institutions
and actors.100 Coordination between the UNFCCC and
other international institutions could improve the effi-
ciency of the respective institutions and reduce unnec-
essary overlap; ensure that the institutions perform
those functions they are best placed to carry out given
their expertise and capacity; ensure that the institutions
act within their jurisdictions in complementary ways;
and enhance the legitimacy of the various institutions
by building support for decisionmaking beyond a single
institution. The article shows that various practical
means of enhancing coordination exist, ranging from
mutual and active observership and information
exchange to more formalized approaches, such as
Memoranda of Understanding.
Questions remain, however, on how to improve coop-
eration and coordination between the UNFCCC and
other institutions. For instance, to which extent should
enhanced cooperation between the UNFCCC and other
multilateral institutions be formalized? While the idea
of a clearer division of labour may sound appealing, it
needs to be clarified how and on what basis responsi-
bilities could and should be divided (or, in some cases,
shared). This includes, for instance, identifying the gov-
ernance functions that the various international insti-
tutions are best placed to carry out.101 Furthermore, it
remains unclear how key climate-related international
legal rules and principles (such as CBDRRC) can be
integrated across international institutions with a view
to ensuring that climate policies from a range of actors
and in different fora are perceived as more legitimate
and work in tandem more effectively.
100 Cf. the ‘facilitative model’ of international law described by D.
Bodansky, The Durban Platform Negotiations: Goals and Options
(Harvard Project on Climate Agreements Viewpoints, July 2012), at
11. In this way, the UNFCCC could possibly act as an ‘orchestrator’
of international climate policy. Cf. K.W. Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘Inter-
national Regulation without International Government: Improving IO
Performance through Orchestration’, 5:3 Review of International
Organizations (2010), 315; K.W. Abbott, P. Genschel, D. Snidal and
B. Zangl, Orchestration: Global Governance through Intermediaries
(6 August 2012), found at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2125452&download=yes>.
101 For an overview of such governance functions, ranging from
agenda setting and research to implementation and monitoring and
reporting, see P. Haas, n. 90 above, at 8–9.
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In conclusion, parties to the UNFCCC should not only
deliver on the ambitious and imperative roadmap set
under the Durban Platform, but also take steps to be the
catalyst at the centre of a wide constellation of institu-
tions with relevant expertise and capacity. Put another
way, weathering the storm that is climate change
requires all relevant international institutions to do
their part on the ship of international climate
governance.
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